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ABSTRACT
In open, dynamic multi-agent systems, agents may form
short-term ad-hoc groups, such as coalitions, in order to
meet their goals. Trust and reputation are crucial concepts
in these environments, as agents must rely on their peers
to perform as expected, and learn to avoid untrustworthy
partners. However, ad-hoc groups introduce issues which
impede the formation of trust relationships. For example,
they may be short-lived, precluding agents from gaining the
necessary experiences to make an accurate trust evaluation.
This paper describes a new approach, inspired by theories
of human organisational behaviour, whereby agents gener-
alise their experiences with known partners as stereotypes
and apply these when evaluating new and unknown part-
ners. We show how this approach can complement existing
state of the art trust models, and enhance the confidence in
the evaluations that can be made about trustees when direct
and reputational information is lacking or limited.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multi-Agent
Systems
General Terms
Experimentation, Performance
Keywords
Trust, Stereotypes
1. INTRODUCTION
Trust is a vital concept in open and dynamic multi-agent
systems, where diverse agents continually join, interact and
leave. In such environments, some agents will inevitably be
more trustworthy than others, displaying varying degrees of
competence and self-interest in different interactions. When
faced with the problem of choosing a partner with whom to
interact, agents must evaluate the candidates and determine
which one is the most trustworthy with respect to a given
interaction and context. While the word ‘trust’ can denote
a rich cognitive structure of beliefs [2], we define trust here
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pragmatically as the degree of belief, or subjective probabil-
ity, with which a trustor believes a trustee will perform as
expected when relied upon [4].
State-of-the-art trust approaches [6, 10, 16, 17] generally
consider an agent’s trust in a potential partner as a function
of prior interactions with that partner, whether they are di-
rectly experienced or relayed by other agents in the society.
The goal of these systems is primarily to maximise the ac-
curacy of this function, and thereby minimise the number of
unsatisfactory experiences an agent suffers when interacting
with others. If an agent has insufficient direct evidence to
form a confident evaluation of another, it can make use of
reputation [15] in the society by obtaining the opinions of
other agents who have previously interacted with it.
Initial cases exist, however, where previous direct and rep-
utational evidence is unavailable. For example, at the be-
ginning of a society’s lifetime, no agents will have interacted
before. This has been termed the “cold start problem” in
recommender systems. In such cases, agents must either
explore the population (e.g. by selecting random partners)
or forego interaction altogether. Similarly, when a new and
unknown trustee enters the system, it is generally not pos-
sible for any trustor to form an evaluation. Evidence can
only be obtained when some agents opt to “take a chance”
on the newcomer rather than interact with a better-known
partner. We refer to these cases as the cold-start and new-
comer cases respectively. In both cases, the problem is one
of how to minimise the risk inherent in“bootstrapping”trust
evaluations when interacting with new, unknown agents.
In this paper, we consider cases where agents interact in
ad-hoc groups. These are organisational structures which
form around a shared goal, and disband once that goal is sat-
isfied. As such, they represent a recurring cold-start prob-
lem. Their life-spans are much shorter than that of the host
system, and so agents may not have enough time to build a
confident trust evaluation in their partners before the group
dissolves. In addition, higher ratios of society size to team
size will result in lower probabilities of agents encountering
known partners in subsequent groups. Indeed, in dynamic
systems, known agents might never be encountered again.
In order to address these issues, we propose a stereotyping
approach, whereby agents can generalise their experiences
with known partners in previous contexts in order to form
tentative trust evaluations about unknown agents in new
contexts. By ascribing trust evaluations to learned classes
of individuals as well as individuals themselves, agents can
make use of previous experiences and reputational opinions
in contexts where this would not otherwise be possible.
2. STEREOTYPES
Modern dynamic human organisations, such as tempo-
rary work groups and global virtual organisations, face sim-
ilar problems with regard to trust as do their analogues in
multi-agent systems. However, researchers in these fields
have found that participants in temporary systems display
trusting behaviours even when they have no access to the di-
rect or reputational sources of evidence traditionally thought
to be necessary for trust to form. In order to address this
phenomenon, the theory of swift trust was developed [7, 13].
Swift trust is a tentative, probationary form of trust based
on, among other things, stereotypical impressions formed
about similar agents in previous contexts. Agents identify
classes of partners based on their visible features, and use
these classes to form behavioural expectations about un-
known agents. Such stereotypical reasoning is held to be
critical in reducing the complexity of human social decision
making [12].
Agents interacting in MASs can adopt a similar stereotyp-
ing approach in order to make trust evaluations when evi-
dence is unavailable. However, unlike human stereotypes,
which are the product of affective and cultural forces [11],
and often negative in nature, agents can build stereotypes
which attempt to model their observations as accurately as
possible. Where relationships exist between agent features
and performance, a stereotyping approach can help agents
to avoid the need to make a random partner selection. The
assumption that agent features may provide useful predic-
tors of future behaviour for a trust evaluation is a reasonable
one. For example, an agent may learn that partners from
a particular organisation tend to perform poorly in certain
contexts, or that agents who have performed competently in
one role can therefore be trusted in another.
To motivate our approach, consider the example of profes-
sional qualifications in human societies. Professional quali-
fications allow people who meet the requirements set by an
awarding body to present a feature to the society signalling
competence in a particular domain. When such individu-
als interact in the society, these signals allow partners to
establish a positive, albeit tentative form of trust despite
the absence of direct or reputational experiences. In this
example, the degree of trust conferred on an accredited in-
dividual is a function of the degree to which the awarding
body is trusted to ensure only competent individuals display
the diagnostic features. In many situations, however, such
prior knowledge of the significance of features may not be
available. In the remainder of this paper, we examine the
general case where trustors must discover for themselves the
relationship between features and trustworthiness.
However, an important requirement of stereotypes is that
they yield to concrete evidence about an individual when it
is available. While stereotypes may provide useful estimates
in initial conditions, they are based on generalisations, and
should therefore carry less weight than direct evidence with
an individual.
We do not attempt to capture here the rich cognitive no-
tions of stereotype formation as it applies to humans, but
rather view a stereotype as a function S : ~F → T mapping
feature vectors of agents, ~F , to initial stereotypical trust
estimates about those agents, T . This allows us to evalu-
ate a model of stereotypes in the context of a general trust
evaluation mechanism.
3. APPROACH
The model we propose here can be applied to any trust
mechanism that uses numerical ratings to compare and ex-
change opinions. We demonstrate its use with a simple prob-
abilistic model based on Subjective Logic which considers di-
rect, reputational and stereotypical sources of information.
We assume here a society of agents, A, which comprises
a set of trustors X ⊆ A, and trustees Y ⊆ A. Each trustor
x ∈ X maintains a set of opinions Ox, the structure of
which will be defined in the following sections. In addition,
we define Rx ⊆ X to be the set of recommender agents
visible to x, and Yx ⊂ Y to be the set of candidate trustees
visible to x. Each agent x ∈ X possesses a trust evaluation
function Ex(y, t, Ox, Rx) which returns a degree of trust for
a trustee y ∈ Yx with respect to a task t, given a set of
existing opinions held by x, Ox, and those of the visible
recommenders, Rx. The behaviour of the function Ex is
described in the course of this section.
Since the primary aim of our trust model is to support
partner selection, we assume that, when presented with a
number of potential candidates Yx, a trustor x will always
select the highest rated candidate in Yx for a task t, denoted
Cx:t, according to that trustor’s evaluation function:
Cx:t = arg max
y∈Yx
Ex(y, t, Ox, Rx) (1)
3.1 Subjective Logic
Subjective Logic (SL) [8] is a belief calculus which allows
agents to express opinions as degrees of belief, disbelief and
uncertainty about propositions. For binary propositions,
such as “agent y is trustworthy with respect to issue t”,
opinions are equivalent beta probability density functions,
and so they are compatible with other probabilistic trust
approaches [9]. We adopt SL as a trust representation be-
cause it provides an intuitive way of capturing an agent’s
degree of belief in another, the degree of uncertainty about
that belief, and the a priori belief in the absence of evidence.
We will briefly outline the fundamental concepts of SL that
are important to our approach, namely belief representation,
evidence, probability expectation and the base rate.
3.1.1 Belief representation
An opinion held by an agent x about agent y performing
a task t in Subjective Logic is represented as a tuple:
ωxy:t = 〈bxy:t, dxy:t, uxy:t, axy:t〉
where bxy:t + d
x
y:t + u
x
y:t = 1, and a
x
y:t ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
In the above opinion representation, bxy:t, d
x
y:t, u
x
y:t, a
x
y:t rep-
resent the degrees of belief, disbelief, uncertainty and the base
rate (or a priori degree of belief) respectively. In each case,
the superscript identifies the belief owner, and the subscript
represents the belief target, i.e. the agent and task that the
opinion pertains to. Each trustor x maintains a set of such
tuples, Ox, which stores its opinions about known trustees
in the system.
3.1.2 Evidence aggregation
Opinions are formed on the basis of evidence aggregated
from different sources which, in turn, are represented as ob-
served frequencies of positive and negative experiences. A
rating held by an agent x about y in evidence representation
is a pair 〈rxy:t, sxy:t〉, where rxy:t is the number of positive ex-
periences observed by x about y, and sxy:t is the number of
observed negative experiences. Equation 3 shows how the
rxy:t and s
x
y:t parameters are used to produce an opinion:
bxy:t =
rxy:t
(rxy:t + s
x
y:t + 2)
dxy:t =
sxy:t
(rxy:t + s
x
y:t + 2)
uxy:t =
2
(rxy:t + s
x
y:t + 2)
(3)
3.1.3 Probability Expectation Value
An opinion’s probability expectation value can be used as
a single valued trust metric, suitable for ranking potential
partners. Equation 4 shows how a probability expectation
value P (ωxy:t) is calculated from an opinion ω
x
y:t. We use the
term rating to mean P (ωxy:t) for a particular opinion ω
x
y:t.
P (ωxy:t) = b
x
y:t + a
x
y:t · uxy:t (4)
By using Equations 4 and 3 together, we can obtain for
a given evidence pair 〈rxy:t, sxy:t〉 a probability expectation
value P (ωxy:t).
3.1.4 Base rate
The base rate parameter axy:t represents the a priori de-
gree of trust x has about y performing task t, before any
evidence has been received. It determines the effect that the
uncertainty parameter uxy:t will have on the resultant prob-
ability expectation value. The default value of axy:t is 0.5,
which means that before any positive or negative evidence
has been received, both outcomes are equally likely. This
means that before any evidence has been received, P (ωxy:t)
= 0.5, which is the least informative value it can take. Values
of axy:t > 0.5 will result in more uncertainty being converted
to belief, and conversely disbelief for axy:t < 0.5.
The base rate parameter provides a means to incorpo-
rate the predictions of our stereotyping model back into the
trust evaluation process. We model the effects of stereotypes
in SL by using the model’s predictions as the base rate.
That is, for a given agent y, the base rate axy:t = S(~Fy).
In this way, stereotypes represent our a priori degrees of
belief. For example, when no evidence has been received
for a particular trustee, we have maximum uncertainty, i.e.
ωxy:t = (0, 0, 1, 0.5). In this case, a
x
y:t alone determines the
value of P (ωxy:t). However, as more evidence is received,
the value of uxy:t decreases, and so the effect of a
x
y:t also
decreases. This satisfies our fundamental condition that a
stereotype must yield to concrete evidence as it is obtained.
Due to the additivity requirement of the bxy:t, d
x
y:t and
uxy:t parameters, the opinion spaces of agents can be visu-
alised as a triangular (ternary) plot (Figure 1), with the top
vertex representing maximum uncertainty, the bottom left
representing maximum disbelief, and the bottom right rep-
resenting maximum belief. The distance from the midpoint
of the leftmost edge represents the degree of belief, the dis-
tance from the midpoint of the rightmost edge represents
disbelief, and the distance from the bottom edge represents
the degree of uncertainty.
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Figure 1: Sample opinion space for a trustor, with
base rate projector shown.
The bottom edge of the triangle represents the classical
probability axis. The base rate value axy:t is plotted here.
In calculating P (ωxy:t), opinions are projected onto this axis
following a line parallel to the base rate projector line (orig-
inating at the uncertainty vertex and ending at a on the
probability axis). Figure 1 shows an example opinion space
with two different base rates. The leftmost opinion has
axy:t = 0.5 (an unbiased opinion) while the rightmost opin-
ion has axy:t = 0.65. This causes the probability expectation
value for the example opinion to become shifted from 0.7 to
0.75.
3.1.5 Reputation
Reputation in probabilistic trust systems is often calcu-
lated by aggregating the rxy:t and s
x
y:t parameters from rep-
utation providers [9, 17]. Since we make the simplifying as-
sumption that all agents report their experiences truthfully
and accurately1, the result of the aggregation of evidence
provided by a set of recommender agents R is a combined
evidence pair 〈r′xy:t, s′xy:t〉 equivalent to one where the evaluat-
ing agent had observed all the aggregated experiences itself:
r′xy:t = r
x
y:t +
X
ρ∈Rx
rρy:t s
′x
y:t = s
x
y:t +
X
ρ∈Rx
sρy:t (5)
Once the evidence parameters have been aggregated, an
opinion and rating for the combined evidence can be calcu-
lated using Equations 3 and 4.
3.2 Learning Stereotypes
As we have mentioned, the goal of our stereotyping mech-
anism is to identify a function S : ~F → T , where ~F is an
agent’s feature vector (a vector of discrete values) and T is
the expected probability of a good outcome (a continuous
real value). When an agent has a collection of experiences
with other agents described by feature vectors, we can make
use of existing machine learning techniques for learning asso-
ciations between sets of discrete attributes and continuous
classes. Specifically, we employ the M5 model tree learn-
ing [1, 14] algorithm2. This algorithm shares some simi-
larities with decision tree classifiers, in that it recursively
1While the issue of deception remains an open problem,
some techniques for addressing this assumption have been
investigated [3, 16]
2We use the M5 implementation of Weka [18], a popular
open-source machine learning toolkit written in Java.
f3=0
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<=0.5
f2=0
>0.5
LM 1 (168/45.611%)
<=0.5
f8=0
>0.5
LM 2 (173/31.222%)
<=0.5
LM 3 (399/24.574%)
>0.5
LM 4 (268/70.199%)
<=0.5
LM 5 (250/115.634%)
>0.5
Figure 2: Example model tree for a stereotype.
constructs a tree for classification. However, while leaves
of decision trees are class labels, the leaves of a model tree
are linear regression models, which are used to predict the
target value (in our case, a probability expectation value).
Figure 2 shows an example model tree representing a learned
stereotype, with agent features as nodes, feature values as
paths, and linear models as leaves.
We define a learning interval L which determines the num-
ber of experiences an agent must accumulate before building
(or re-building) its stereotype model. Once an agent has ob-
tained L experiences, the stereotyping process proceeds as
follows. For each opinion ωxy:t ∈ Ox, unless uxy:t = 1 (to-
tally uncertain opinions add no knowledge to the model) we
add the example (~Fy, P (ω
x
y:t)) to the training set. The tree is
then constructed. In this way, an agent may build a model of
the relationships between the observable features of trustees
and the degrees of trust placed in them. Subsequently, when
evaluating an agent y′ for which we have no evidence, the
model tree can be used to obtain a predicted trust value
for P (ωxy′:t). With this value, we can create a new opinion
about y′, setting the predicted value as the base rate. This
satisfies our requirements for the S function.
3.3 Stereotypical Reputation
While stereotypes can help in initial cases, they still re-
quire a number of examples of interactions to be built up in
order to construct a predictive model. New trustors entering
the system are initially at a disadvantage while they gather
the experiences from which to form a stereotype, while ex-
isting trustors may already possess useful stereotypes. We
propose here a way to extend the use of stereotypical evalu-
ations to the reputational case, by allowing new trustors to
make use of stereotypical reputation gathered from experi-
enced trustors who have already constructed stereotypes.
When evaluating a given agent y, a trustor x will perform
a stereotype query when the following conditions hold: (1) x
cannot produce a direct evaluation for y, (2) no reputational
evidence about y can be found, and (3) x cannot yet form
its own stereotype about y.
In this case, x can ask reputation providers if they are able
to provide stereotypical reputation of y, in lieu of experien-
tial evidence. Even if no agent in the system has interacted
with y before, it is possible that some agents may have al-
ready constructed a stereotype from interactions with sim-
ilar agents to y. On receiving a stereotype query about y
from x, a reputation provider r checks whether it already has
Table 1: Trustee Profiles
Profile Id Mean StDev f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
p1 0.9 0.05 x x
p2 0.6 0.15 x x
p3 0.4 0.15 x x
p4 0.3 0.1 x x x
p5 0.0 1.0 x x x
Table 2: Experimental Conditions
Condition Description
GG Global interaction, global reputation
AG Ad-hoc group interaction, global reputation
AA Ad-hoc group interaction and reputation
GGS GG + Stereotypes
AGS AG + Stereotypes
AAS AA + Stereotypes
a stereotypical evaluation for y. If so, the value is returned.
Otherwise, r attempts to form a stereotypical evaluation of
y and returns the result to x.
Once all stereotypical ratings have been received, x uses
the following equation to derive a mean bias for y:
SRxy:t =
X
ρ∈Rx
cρs
ρ
y:tX
ρ∈Rx
cρ
(6)
Equation 6 shows how stereotypical reputation SRxy:t is
calculated as the weighted mean of all returned stereotyp-
ical ratings sρy:t, weighted by the provider’s confidence in
its stereotype model cρ. In our model, this is given by the
root mean squared error (RMSE) of the stereotype model
of an agent ρ, Sρ. This provides a measure of the model’s
accuracy as a function of the differences between the actual
opinions and those predicted by the model. Therefore the
closer a stereotype fits the observed experiences, the more
weight its output is given when calculating the mean:
cρ = 1−
vuuuut
X
ω
ρ
y:t∈Oρ
(P (ωρy:t)− Sx(~Fy))2
|Oρ| (7)
In this way, new trustors with few experiences can leverage
the stereotypes of more experienced agents in order to make
evaluations about new trustees.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental Setup
In evaluating our approach, we employed a simulated agent
society where a set of trustor agents X interact with a set of
trustee agents Y over a number of rounds. Each trustee is
assigned a performance profile which determines how it will
behave. Each profile specifies the mean and standard devia-
tion parameters of a Gaussian distribution from which sim-
ulated interaction outcomes will be drawn (from the range
[0,1]). In addition, each profile also specifies a number of in-
formative features shared by all agents of that profile. In this
Table 3: Experimental Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Nagents 500 Trustee agent count
Ntrustors 20 Trustor agent count
Ngroups 20 Ad-hoc group count
Nnf 6 No. of noise features
PI 0.8 Interaction probability
Pstrustee 0.1 Trustee swap probability
Glt 5 Ad-hoc group lifetime
Gsize 10 Ad-hoc group size
L 100 Learning interval
way, we define the target feature-behaviour relationships we
wish our agents to identify. All features are represented as
binary variables, each one signifying presence or absence of
a given feature.
Since we use continuous values to represent trustee perfor-
mance, and subjective logic requires frequencies of positive
and negative experiences, each trustor x uses a subjective
evaluation function Fx(v, t) to map an observed, objective
performance value v in a particular task t to a subjective
binary evaluation of performance. This function could vary
between trustors, so that different trustors “perceive” the
same outcome differently. However, for simplicity, we as-
sume that all agents use the same function for all tasks,
based around a threshold performance value:
Fx(v, t) =

1 : v ≥ 0.5
−1 : v < 0.5
The test profiles used in our experiments are given in Ta-
ble 1. The profile p1 represents a completely reliable class of
agents, while p4 represents agents who will always perform
poorly. Profiles p2 and p3 represent unreliable agents who
may perform well or poorly, and p5 represents agents with
uniform performance distributions. Agents of type p5 add
noise to the stereotyping process, because their random per-
formance confuses the identification of informative features.
In addition to the informative profile features, agents are
also assigned a number of non-informative noise features
(Nnf ), which are not related to profiles. This allows us to
evaluate the stereotyping algorithm’s ability to deal with
features which do not correlate with performance.
In each round, each trustor will decide to interact with
probability PI . If the trustor chooses to interact, it con-
tacts the environment for a list of available agents, and uses
its trust model to evaluate the result. The trustor will also
obtain a list of available reputation providers from the envi-
ronment and query them for evidence. The trustee with the
highest rating (probability expectation value) according to
the trust model will then be selected.
We simulate global population dynamism with the param-
eter PL, which determines, for each trustee, the probability
that it will leave the society entirely. If a trustee leaves, it is
replaced immediately with a new trustee of the same profile
as the first. This enables us to maintain the balance of pro-
files while making the task more difficult for the trustors. As
we are interested in ad-hoc teams of agents, we use three pa-
rameters, Ngroups , Glt , and Gsize which control the number
of groups to be created, the group lifetime, and the group
size respectively.
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Figure 3: GG vs. GGS
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Figure 4: AG vs. AGS
We consider six experimental conditions in total, the pa-
rameters of which are summarised in Table 2.
InGG, trustors can interact with any trustee, and all other
trustors can be queried for reputational evidence. In AG,
only interaction within the ad-hoc group to which the trustor
is assigned is allowed, but trustors can perform global rep-
utational queries. In AA both interaction and reputational
queries are constrained to the ad-hoc group. The final three
cases are as above, but trustors employ stereotyping func-
tionality.
In the ad-hoc group conditions, we create Ngroups groups
to which trustees are randomly assigned such that all groups
have at least Gsize agents. Then, trustors are randomly as-
signed to groups. Groups interact for Glt rounds, at which
point they are disbanded and the assignment process begins
again. We have deliberately set the group lifetime to be
short, to simulate ad-hoc group/coalition settings. Trustors
therefore only have a small window of opportunity to eval-
uate trustees before the groups are reconfigured.
Table 3 details the parameter sets for the experiments. All
parameters remain constant across conditions unless other-
wise indicated for the purpose of highlighting their effects.
4.2 Results
Here we present the results of our experiments. Each run
consisted of 800 interaction rounds, which was sufficient to
observe the stereotype model achieve a stable performance
gain in each case. 100 trustees of each profile were created.
By creating an even distribution of agent profiles, we aim
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Figure 5: AA vs. AAS
to minimise any effect caused by agents being more or less
likely to encounter agents of one profile than another. Also,
due to the level of dynamism in the simulation, some agents
may find themselves assigned to ad-hoc groups comprising
only good or bad partners. As a result, the performance of
individual agents may be affected by chance as well as the
performance of their respective trust models. In order to
minimise this effect and illustrate the model’s performance,
the graphs presented here plot themean interaction outcome
of the trustor population as a whole at each interaction.
Figure 3 shows the performance of both standard and
stereotyping models in the GG condition. Both models per-
form well, with agents in both conditions quickly identify-
ing trustworthy partners. The only experimental parameter
which presents a challenge for the non-stereotyping model
in this condition is Pstrustee, which introduces the chance
that known and trusted agents will leave the system and be
replaced with new, unknown ones. In these instances, the
stereotyping model is able to produce an initial evaluation
about newcomers based on past experiences, even when the
subjects of those experiences have left the system.
Figure 4 shows the performance of the non-stereotyping
model against the stereotyping model in the AG/AGS con-
ditions. The first thing we notice is that both models begin
performing more poorly than in the GG condition. Again,
once the learning interval has passed, the performance of
the stereotyping agents diverges significantly from that of
the non-stereotyping condition, eventually surpassing 0.8.
The non-stereotyping condition settles much lower at 0.6.
Figure 5 shows the performance of both models in the
most challenging case, where any interaction outside of the
ad-hoc group is prohibited. Here we see a very similar pat-
tern to that of Figure 4, although the performance of the
stereotyping agents improves more slowly. This is caused by
the reduced reputational evidence available to stereotyping
agents during the learning interval.
We found that in each of the six conditions, the stereo-
typing model outperformed3 the standard model after the
first learning interval. In each case, the stereotyping model
performs similarly to the standard model while training ex-
amples are gathered. However, once the the first learning
interval has passed, stereotyping agents begin to improve,
whereas non-stereotyping agents do not.
3The results above were found to be statistically significant
by t-test with p < 0.05.
4.2.1 Dynamism
To evaluate the model’s performance in scenarios with a
high degree of dynamism (i.e. agents join and leave rapidly
and unpredictably), we set the value of Pstrustee to 0.5, which
means that in each round, every trustee may be replaced
with probability 0.5. Such a high degree of dynamism, while
unrealistic, allows us to observe how the stereotyping model
performs in an extreme case. As evident from Figure 6, the
non-stereotyping model cannot achieve much better than an
average performance of 0.5; i.e. no better than chance. The
stereotyping model, on the other hand, improves to 0.8 after
L interactions.
4.2.2 Noise features only
In order to observe the performance of the model when no
predictive features are present, we removed all the features
from the profiles, so that only noise features were assigned.
As these are randomly assigned, there is no hidden correla-
tion between noise features and performance. As we would
expect, Figure 7 shows that both models perform identically
when no feature correlation exists.
4.2.3 Unreliable profile features
Until now, we have enforced a completely positive corre-
lation between profile features and performance. However,
in open MAS, features may not be so reliable as predictors
of behaviour. In order to evaluate the performance of the
model when this assumption is relaxed, we set the probabil-
ity with which an agent will be assigned a feature from its
profile to 0.8, and the probability that a non-profile feature
will be assigned to 0.2. As shown in Figure 8, the model
is still able to achieve a higher level of performance, albeit
not by a large margin. In further trials, we found that as
these two parameters are adjusted towards 0.5, the model
begins to behave identically to the non-stereotyping model,
because profile features are completely uninformative under
those conditions.
4.2.4 Number of Noise Features
To test the model’s resilience to noise features, we per-
formed a series of trials with increasing numbers of noise
features, but fixed numbers of informative profile features.
As can be seen from Figure 9, the number of noise features
generated does not significantly impact on the performance
of the algorithm. This is encouraging, as agents could be
described by very large feature vectors, with very few diag-
nostic features, if any.
5. DISCUSSION
The results we have presented show that a stereotyping
mechanism based on established machine learning techniques
can clearly help agents to make trust evaluations in situ-
ations where both direct and reputational evidence is not
forthcoming. Under the assumption that correlations ex-
ist between trustee features and their performance, our ap-
proach can make use of this information. When this as-
sumption does not hold, we have shown that the stereotyp-
ing model performs at least as well as the non-stereotyping
model.
One possible drawback to our approach is the use of the
learning interval L to control the formation of stereotypes
in a simple way. The problem lies in selecting an appropri-
ate value; if L is too small, stereotypes may be computed
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Figure 6: AA vs. AAS, Pstrustee = 0.5
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Figure 7: AA vs. AAS, noise features only
too early and too frequently. Also, early stereotypes which
are based on little data may result in inaccurate expecta-
tions about the trustworthiness of a stereotyped partner.
Conversely, if L is too large, then the resulting model will
be insensitive to changes in the stereotypical behaviours of
agents. A better strategy would be to utilise statistics about
the accuracy of the computed stereotype model to decide
whether stereotypes should be re-computed (or disabled, if
no feature-behaviour correlations are believed to exist). As
can be seen in Figure 10, lower values of the L parameter
result in an earlier but slower increase in performance over
time. Higher values cause the model to wait longer before
taking effect, but allow the stereotypes to be built from more
evidence, resulting in the observed steeper increase in per-
formance over time.
While we have referred to a number of trust evaluation
models in this paper, it is worth highlighting here some re-
lated approaches which attempt to address the issues of spe-
cific interest. The FIRE [6] system employs role-based trust
to explicitly capture relationships between agents in certain
roles. In this approach, rules specify an initial, predeter-
mined degree of trust that will be conferred on partners for
whom the rules match. This means that a degree of trust
may be present even when no evidence is available. In con-
trast with our approach, where stereotyping rules are learned
from observations, FIRE rules are explicitly specified in a
domain specific manner by agent owners. However, the use
of such explicit role-based knowledge may be an interesting
starting point for combining these two approaches.
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Figure 8: AA vs. AAS, unreliable profile features
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Hermoso et al. [5] consider exploiting the organisational
structure of Virtual Organisations to calculate trust approx-
imations. They consider trust about triples 〈B,R, I〉 whose
members denote an agent in a particular role engaged in
a particular interaction, respectively. They use this repre-
sentation to define several different types of generalisation
which can be applied to obtain an approximate trust value.
For example, 〈 , R, I〉 denotes the degree of trust any agent
in role R performing interaction I, whereas 〈B, , I〉 denotes
the degree of trust in agent B, performing interaction I in
any role. The aggregation of fully instantiated trust experi-
ences is carried out using the weighted mean of experiences
which match the pattern. While this approach does not deal
with initial cases such as described in this paper, its query-
like notation provides an intuitive way to generalise from
individual trust experiences to useful approximations.
It is worth mentioning that the problem of trust evalu-
ation that we address here is distinct from the problem of
deciding to trust. For the purposes of this paper we have
employed a model of decision most commonly found in trust
literature which involves selecting the most trusted agent
(Equation 1). However, this approach is not always appro-
priate, as it does not consider the degree of risk in a given
interaction. For example, different trustees may ‘cost’ more
to use than others. How should a trustor choose between two
agents y1 and y2, with ratings ω
x
y1:t = 0.8 and ω
x
y2:t = 0.85,
when y2 costs ten times as much as y1? Future work will
address these issues with a richer model of trust decision, as
well as evaluation.
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Figure 10: AAS, increasing L parameter
6. CONCLUSIONS
In open MASs, a number of situations can arise where
a trust evaluation must be made, but no direct supporting
evidence can be found. When a trustee is completely un-
known, direct evidence can only obtained (and subsequently
propagated as reputation) when a trustor takes a risk and
interacts with the newcomer.
We have presented an approach for improving the per-
formance of trust mechanisms in such initial cases when by
allowing trust evaluations to be “bootstrapped” by a priori
assumptions based on stereotypes. We have demonstrated
how a stereotyping approach can be used together with a
relatively straightforward probabilistic trust model in order
to significantly improve performance.
Where hidden feature-behaviour correlations exist in the
trustee population, our model has been shown to be robust
when both interaction and reputation gathering was con-
strained to within ad-hoc groups. Our model performs well
when the probability of agents leaving, joining or chang-
ing identity is high. It has been shown to be resilient to
increasing levels of random noise in agent feature vectors.
When the assumption that hidden feature-behaviour corre-
lations exist does not hold, the stereotyping model performs
no worse than the non-stereotyping model. We therefore
conclude that stereotyping can assist in bootstrapping trust
evaluations in the problematic initial cases addressed here.
The stereotyping approach presented here can compliment
existing trust evaluation techniques. Since our model consid-
ers continuous class values, it is directly compatible with any
model which reduces its dimensions to a single real measure
of trust, regardless of whether the measure is probabilistic
or statistical in nature.
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